How New Syria will change the water equation & water diplomacy in the Middle East

Dursun Yildiz, Dogan Yildiz, Mehmet Samil Gunes

Abstract— After seven years long civil war, Syria move to another phase and federal, confederal models are more pronounced than before. Oil and gas pipelines has always played very significant role in the future of the Middle-East. Experts says that Middle East has been reshaping on the base of new energy equation in the Eastern Mediterrranean and new oil-gas transport route n the Middle East. Safe transportation plan of oil and gas resources to the west in a secure area has New Syria and reshaped the region. The new design of the region will fed the mistrust betweeen neighbours and change the water equation adversely. New cantoons, new states or federational of Syria-Iraq will bring new actors in regional hydropolitics. It will also create lack of trust and lack of confidence between neighbours in the region that may lead to re-securitize the water making water diplomacy uneffective in the Middle East. Syria's new structure is slowly becoming more pronounced in international area. In this article, we aim to analyse these developments regarding water security issues. We also argued that how climate change may impact current water equation and water diplomacy in the New Middle East

Index Terms— Reshaped Syria, New Water Equation, Statistical Hydrology, Water Management, New Syria, Euphrates and Tigris, Transboundary waters

1 INTRODUCTION

After **seven** years of **war**, the Assad government, backed by Russian and Iranian military muscle, controls much of central **Syria** again. Although the political system of New Syria is not certain yet, it is likely to be a federative structure.

The partition or federalization of Syria in the end of the Syrian Civil War has been more pronounced since last 6 months .In the broadest sense, it means turning the centralized Syrian Arab Republic into a federal republic with autonomous subdivisions. It also means that new political entities and borders might be visible in near Future in the Middle East.

In parallel to this political uncertinities, climate change is also an emerging threat in the region. Some part of the region has known as the world's most water short region and water resources is under the threat of ongoing climate change . Therefore political and climatical situation call an "emergency" for asutainable water management. But there is no political will and power to achieve water policy objectives that are strongly required for sustainable human life in the region. This highly uncertain and difficult political environment will make achieving any policy objective very difficult.

Ensuring water security will be primarily concerned in administrations that will emerge in the reshaped Middle East.

It seems that existing surface and groundwater resources in the region, the location of water storage and water transmission structures, the irrigated areas have already been effective to draw the possible new boundaries. Besides various other political problems in the region, a weak federation based on ethnic and sectarian bases or similar structures may create serious problems related to the use of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in the middle and long term.

New borders or new federative and confederative political structures, together with climate change impact on water resources will bring "water secure land concept" at the top of the agenda of the new political system. This can force to change the current water equation in the region. Euphrates and Tigris River water allocation might be brought back to the table to solve water security. It should be noted that all these situations are strongly depend on the type of the new political structure in the region.

If the new political structuring of the region occurs in a fragmented way, this can lead to radical changes in the regional hydropolitics. In order to meet the needs of the newly established water-poor administrations, a new water equation will be set up in the New Middle East. Although it is known that considering of Tigris and Euphrates for the whole Middle East is not possible due to water budget or international law, this proposal will definitely take its place in the first part of the agenda.

In sum, rearranged political borders in the Middle East or new federative system will lead to an increase in the unknowns of the "Middle East Water Equation" and make it more difficult to solve.

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Fig. 1. Euphrates and Tigris River Basin in the Middle East

In the new political shape of the region, the emergence of new political structures that can claim water directly or indirectly, or which can claim water in various ways even if they are not riparian to the Tigris and the Euphrates, can completely change the water equation and make it difficult.

There are other factors and actors that may make this equation more difficult than before. Iran, which is a significant contributor to the waters of Tigris, will try to take part in the water equation more than it used to be. New sectarian formations in the region can push Iran to take a more active stance on this issue. On the other hand, the relations of regions such as southern Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan which are still suffering from water shortages to the new political borders and the situation of the Golan Heights which is very important for Israeli water security will also make the solution of "Water Equation in the Middle East" difficult.

This complex and uncertain situation of the new Middle East will also put the Water Diplomacy in a very difficult situation.

2 Review of the Region

2.1 New Security Concept and Water Securitisation in the Region

Architecture of security in the Middle East has already been dramatically changed since last 7 years. It seems that this will continue in the last 10 years as localizied unstability.

Apart from national security that is the first priority since last 7 years in the Syria and Iraq, the field of security studies is extended in the beginning of the 21st century, including various dimensions such as water security, climate security, energy security and food security.

Mosello explained that when water management became associated with security concerns, It has been labelled as the "securitisation of water resource management" [1]. Securitization means that an issue is linked to national security concern, taken out of the normal domain of technical managemen [1].

Several securitization mechanisms were used simultaneously in all cases in the Middle East; in the case of the West Bank Aquifer, for example, resource capture (structural securitization) went hand in hand with joint water management committees (institutional securitization). In all cases language played a crucial role in the securitization of water resources, especially in the cases of Egypt and Israel where the symbolic value of water and land are closely tied with religious traditions inherited from ancient times [2].

The redisigned New Middle East is likely to create a stronger case of securitisation of water management that may postpone the vital regional cooperation on water resources development.

2.2 Future of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is linked

Today's result is that the US and Russia will be decisive in the future of the region, which will live in a critical period for a long time. This strategy is also a planned strategy not only for the Middle East but also for the Eastern Mediterranean which has increased its geostrategic significance today.

Nowadays, "Efficient Syria" "Livable Syria" started to be pronounced was the main factor that determines today's result. In fact, quickly established boundaries of the new district with color moving on Syria map was the natural boundaries of the livable Syria zone. Despite Assad's claim on reassert dominance in all Syria geographies after a seven-year war, Northeren Syria except for safe zone created by Turkey seems to be a US -back Kurdish Control zone. The most fundamental issues that cannot be implemented but available in the old plan on the strategy table have been unable to complete exit corridor of northern Syria to the Mediterranean fort he time being.

Fig. 2. The Corridor Plan to the Eastern Mediterranean

Eastern Mediterranean passage or corridor offers a very attractive opportunity to appropriate route seekers for the opening to the global economy in shortest and safest way of rapidly increasing oil production in the region (Fig.2). Eastern Mediterranean passage offers a very attractive opportunity. Besides the opening of Eastern Mediterranean corridor, being safe passage of this corridor is also important. Being stable of this region is one of the most important pillars of the corridor plan. Being sustainable of a political formation established in this region is directly related to the region being "functioning". The meaning of this is that creation a new political structure at least in certain areas of the region in terms of rules, legal structure and relations with the free market. This is the preferred choice of the transnational companies that produce oil in the

region. The difference between Barzani's domain and other groups in northern Iraq is clearly shows this. For all these reasons, proclamation of federal or cantonal structure of Turkey's not confirm is possible, but maintaining it is very difficult in northern Syria with 911 kilometers border with us.

Turkey's legitimate intervention (getting Russia on its side) quashed this equation in northern Syria that its coloring and shaping is accelerated as a natural result of the Mediterranean corridor strategy. With this intervention, play returned again to chess tables of macro regional strategies.

It is clear that the countries that will be newly established or the continuation of the previous in the region will be the most vulnerable to mass violence and conflict risk if the countries have little connection with the global economy. There is no chance of having a stable future when the cantonal, sectarian, ethnic, identity-based formations in the region do not fulfill the other conditions. This situation also emerges with the fact that Syria and Iraq are brought up to today by which administrative idea.

Russia has seen the best results of its disintegration and stated in 2011 that "every intervention in the region would be intervene that returns the Middle East to the bloodstream and not be recovered". The developments have justified Russia and allow it to be prepared for the region.

2.3 Russia: AStrong Key Player in the Middle East

The chaos in Iraq and Syria has turned into proxy wars including regional and global powers. Russia, foreseeing that this process will be very long and chaotic, provided full support to Assad in a planned manner since the beginning of the process. While this support was the most decisive factor for the region, Russia also increased its dominance in the region. The current influence of Iran over Iraq and its relationship with Russia revealed the intention of Iran to exist in the redesign of the region.

In the last period, Russia, which quickly turned its relations with Turkey to normal, played an active role in this region for the first time in its history. It can be said that in this decision, it can be said that the vacancy of the strategy of USA on intending to withdraw from the region and intending to lead from back is effective.

When looking at the latest developments in Iraq, it is expected that the effect of Iran on Iraq will increase, and Russia will be effective on "Assad Syria" and the Mediterranean coast in Partial Syria. This indicates that the influence of the Russian-Iranian alliance which is also supported by Turkey in this region may be decisive in the future. These developments will ensure that the hand of Russia is much stronger than in the past for the security of the northern Iraqi oil way to the Mediterranean and for the control of operations include Gazprom in the Eastern Mediterranean and the region, Russia is making stronger preparations in the Middle East against the moves the US will make in the near future to increase its strength on the axis of the Asia Pacific.

In the future, Russia may seek to establish co-operation by including the UK which separated from the EU, and France which thinks different from USA foreign policy especially for the Mediterranean. The most fundamental determining power behind this cooperation is the importance of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas for Europe. Recent developments have revealed that the Eastern Mediterranean will play a more decisive role in shaping the transitional future of the Middle East.

In conclusion, Russia has been a key player in the Syria and obtained a very important geostrategical position in a alawi region of western Syria that opens to Eastern Mediterranean The above explanations show that the outline of a new formation in the Middle East emerges. Two things will play a very fundamental role in the new order of the Middle East. The first of these is the sharing of energy and water resources, the second one is a safe exit to the Eastern Mediterranean.

New Syria and re-design in the Middle East could change the water equation far away from the co-operation. Indeed, the fact that the new order in the region (balance in chaos) is directly connected to the allocation of resources is a matter that is not to be forgotten by those who re-design this region 100 years later.

2.4 RAND Cooperation Peace Plan for Syria

The RAND Corporation is one of the primary think tanks in United States that have build policy (guideline) and determination making at the apical level.

Any analysis that come out of RAND, it indicates the direction the politicians will take in America [3].



Fig. 3. Current zones in Syria as of August 2018 [4]

It should also be noted that this recent report by same think tank establishment respecting the peace plan for Syrian Arab Republic acknowledge with much of the Brooking's Institutions report on deconstruction Syria towards a regionalized action.

The RAND report pointed out that Syrian Arab Republic would find itself split into practically four zones; one controlled by the regime; one controlled by the Kurdish; one controlled by various aspects of the Sunni resistance and last one controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). [3].

It is interesting to note that the map given in Fig 3. Shows some similar zones that RAND was pointing out in their

outline for Syria in 2015. [5].

2.5 Effects of Climate Change to Euphrates Tigris River Basin Water Management

In the region, climate changes will have a series of consequences such as diminishing river flow, lower agricultural production resulting the mass migration flow to the cities.

Although the climate change is a mutual hazard, may supports countries to performance collectively to tackle the common challenge, it seems that there wont be effective political will in the region to act together for coming years. This would create a new forced water equation and make the Hydro diplomacy very difficult in the region.

(a) Syria (1900-201

(b) Turkey (1900-2012)

Fig. 4. (a) (b) The monthly meanly rainfall and temperature data chart to show the baseline climate and seasonality by month(Climatic Research Unit of University of East Anglia).

Long term monthly temperature and rainfal for Syria and Turkey is given in Figure 4. Long term data between 1900 and 2012 shows that Syria has worse condition regarding monthly temperature and rainfall than condition in Turkey. This figüre and emerging climate change effects should encourage to work together and to establish more collaborative relation despite their political and ideological difference But let alone collaboration, new borders may bring distrust and new hostility resulting lack of cooperation.

2.6 How New Syria will change the water equation and hydro diplomacy

Water is a constant strategical concern in the Middle East. However, it hasn't discussed enough about how New Syria and reshaped Iraq will effect sustainability of the new political system in the region.

In general we see that attention has focused on the present military dangers in the site ommiting the real threat coming towards the new possible political borders of the Middle East.

It can be assumed that the state's framework and a central government will be preserved in Syria, due to the large number of parties having an interest in this, including Russia, the United States, the countries of the Middle East, and the majority of the local population. Nonetheless, the internal Syrian system is likely to be left with "hybrid" features, since years of war and the crystallization of different competing forces in this divided country will make it difficult for the central government to achieve broad legitimacy and institutionalize effective governance throughout all its territory..

It seems that 7 years civil war and it's consequences of new political system of Syria would bring new political structure in the region. Although it hasn't been achieved a multi lateral-agreement on transboundary water issues between riparean states, relationship between Turkey and Iraq-Syria was relatively warmer in the begining of the 2000's. . Syria became key to Turkey's "zero problems with neighbours" policy and its openning to the Arab World. The outbreak of the anti-government uprising in Syria in 2011 put an abrupt end to this short-lived relationship. Looking at New Syria effects on water equation it can be seen two axis that will be effective to change water equation and Hydro Diplomacy in the Middle East.

First axis is the emerging impact on climate change that has been experienced as drought period three times in Syria before civil-war. Second axis can be defined as the new Middle East State System which will be shaped after disintegration or new political structure of present states.This will create new political actors and political landscape.This will clearly bring distrust, hostility, lack of cooperation that complicates peace agreement and collaboration against climate change effects. As it is known Syria was effected by long term drought before unrest.

It is clear that new political structure of Syria and Iraq could aggravate political tensions in the Region.It can be noted that it will not be easy to create a collobrative approach to tackle the climate change effects with this new and caotic situation in the region.

In this case the states may choose the way of re- securitization of water resources that will be directly effective on new water equation and water diplomacy in the region. Untrust and lack of cooperation will be core of this behaviour and

climate change is more likely to change the water equaition and regional hydropolitics as a result of this new landscape. Therefore beginning from the new political structure of Syria, emerging climate change effects and other political factors seem to change the water equation and regional hydropolitics in near future.

However, we should admit that climate change will be effective but won't be the only factor in future conflict of the New Middle East. It will be an important factor to be raised political tension between countries. It is obvious that apart from climate change threat ultimately the wider political situation will determine the effectivenes of Hydro Diplomacy. But future political situation in the region and climate change effects have a lot of uncertinities that will put the future of the region in more caotic situation. For instance scarce resources and forced migration may easily become a cause of conflict again in near future if any measures cant be taken that is almost impossible under this circumtancies.

3 METHODS

3.1. Study Area

The Euphrates Tigris Basin (ETB) is a crucial drainage area in the Middle East, and ETB flows a region of about 880,000 km2 (Fig. 1 and Fig. 3). The watershed spreads in the regions of Iraq (%46), Turkey (%22), Iran (%22), Syria (%11), Saudi Arabia (%1,9) and Jordan (%0,03) [6].

The Euphrates Tigris Basin has been established important



aspects in hydrologic and geologic attributes of the Mesopotamian civilization [7]. The Euphrates River Basin with an yearly entire streamflow about 30 billion cubic meters [8] arise from Eastern Turkey and extents to the Southeast side of Turkey [9]. The eastern Anatolian highlands of Turkey give about %90 of the Euphrates entire yearly streamflow, quite additions comes from the Syria highlands [10].

Fig. 5. Annual mean precipitation in the Euphrates River basin

The Tigris River (yearly entire flow around 50 bcm) [6] emerges from the Taurus Mountains of southeast Turkey. Tigris river basin flows beyond the Mesopotamia lowlands by pursuing the ground of the Zagros Mountains. The Southeastern Anatolian Mountains of Turkey supports about %50 of the entire Tigris streamflow, while the rresting streamflow comes from various channels that arise in the Zagros Mountains between Iraq and Iran [8, 10].

On the other hand, we need to aware of that Euphrates Tigris Basin rivers have been at the center of international challenges over water related issues [11].

(a)

(b)



Fig. 6. (a) Maximum Temperature and (b) Minimum Temparature Change for Turkey and Syria (Data Source: U.S. National Climatic Data Center (NCDC))

Because of the enclosing mountains, the ETB takes much of the rainfall in wintertime [12].

Yearly precipitation in the low areas is rougly 300 mm, whereas it comes to nearly 600 mm in the high sides (Fig. 5.) [13].

Yearly mean surface temperature of low and highlands are closely 20 ^{0}C and 9 ^{0}C, properly (Fig. 6). Monthly divisions of the flow measurement stations placed in the headwaters of the ETB in Eastern Anatolia demonstrates that 60–80% of their entire annual streamflows take places in March and June term with a peak in April [14].

3.2. Trend Analysis

There are many techniques that can be used to see trends and other patterns of hydrological data. The hydrological trend analyses focal point on rainfall, evapotranspiration, and

runoff(drainage), avoiding the water storage change.

The rainfall (precipitation) changes is the most critical indicator of climate change from the hydrologic angle. The observed runoff incorporates the influence of climate change and human activities. In the present study, the precipitation used by U.S. National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) from 1951 to 2000 reflect the impact of climate change on the Euphrates Tigris River Basin.

Moving average means method used for the obtaining and making more prominently trends and other components. When the



Fig. 7. (a, b) Seasonal Average Station Precipitation Values, Decadal Variability & Linear Trend from 1951-2000 for Syria. (Data Source: U.S. National Climatic Data Center (NCDC)).

process is performed, it is necessary to determine in advance how many data to be taken into the moving average process. More specifically, if we take three arithmetic means, it is called 3rd order moving average. For the hydrological data from 3rd order taken as $X_i(i=1,2,.....,n)$ and X values resulted with Y values as $Y_i(i=1,2,.....,n-2)$. It can be formulated easily as we seen below.

$$Y_1=(X_1+X_2+X_3)/3, Y_2= (X_2+X_3+X_4)/3,....., Y_{n-2}=(X_{n-2}+X_{n-1}+X_n)/3 \quad (1)$$

As shown in Figure 7 (a,b) long term precipitation data obtained and used in statistical analyses showed a decline tendency in Syria. Kamishli and Deir ez-Zor Meteorological Weather Stations (Fig. 7) data used in the statistical model is obtained from U.S. National Climatic Data Center.

Obtained prediction value using lineer trend method in Deir ez-Zor station between 1951-2000 showed –10,33 decreasing trend. In the Kamishli station this value has been obtained as -25,72 in decreasing trend. Precipitation data obtained these two main gauging station located in Syria shows significantly decreasing trend. These results obtained clearly support some climate change predictions that indicates shortage of water in the region.

Time series of seasonal average (black-line) rainfall (with average mm and month) at the nearest measurement station, it is critical (decadal) component with the linear trend maintained (blue-line), and it is linear trend (red-line) for the preferred

season over the selected year range (1950-2000). The seasonal-average for a given year is determined and showed.



Fig. 8. Regional Climate Change Model projections (a) Average temperature changes (0C) relative to the 1990s (b) Precipitation changes (%) relative to the 1990s [16].

Figure 8 clearly shows the sharply rising trend in temperature indicating that water management policies will be much more important in near future in the region.

Through the most widely used are GCMs (Global-Climate-Models) that catch the nonlinear complexity of the area to see differences across the climate system for decisive process and matters.



Fig. 9. Mean projected rainfall and temperature for Syria and Turkey on The Middle East Region (2020-2039)

Time series is constructed by first determining the seasonal average rainfalls, and determining the anomaly from the long term mean of the same.

Secondly, the linear best-fit to the anomalies (as shown in F7) is subtracted, and, lastly, the eleven-year running average of the detrended anomalies is subtracted(Source: World Band Data Center).

3.3. Effects of Projected Climate Change on the Region

Climate models results show hotter, drier and less predictable climate. Less rainfall and higher temperatures will reduce the flow of rivers and make the entire region more arid.

It is obvious that these changes will be adversly effective on agriculture and water management. When temperature increases moderately, some expert argued that the Euphrates River could shrink by 30 percent and the Jordan River by 80 percent by the end of the century [15].

The Figure 9 indicates average monthly temperatures and precipitation for Syria and Turkey for the period 2020 to 2039. Projected changes are calculated from a 20 year historical control period covering the years 1986-2005.

Although Figure 9 shows the similar trend on precipitation and temprature between Turkey and Syria, Syria is likely to more serious water management problems because of destroyed water infrastructure and lack of water management system in a large part of the Syria since last 6 years.

Lines in the Figure 9 shows the absolute-values (uncorrected) of the climatology from particular CMIP5 climate model simulations. The models given here performs the best presently available data to outline acceptable future changes in the climatologiy of temperatures and rainfall over the implicated regions. The data was produced by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of University of East Anglia (UEA).

Climate changes predictions for basin and interested region futures could be seen in some powerful climate scenarios such as A2, A1B and A2. These scenarios has own features and capabilities.

The A2 scenario characterizes a very different worlds. Potency standards beyond areas converge in a slow movement, which consequences in large population increase. Economical developments are mainly oriented and per capita economical gain and technologic changes are more disintegrate scenarios.

The A1B projection characterize a future world with accelerated economical improvement, small population increase.

The B1 scheme characterizes a convergent system with the exact small population increase as in the A1 projection, although with fast switchs in economical format toward a services and informational economy [17].

Fig. 10. SRES Euphrates-Tigris River Basin Climate Model Scenarios for 2030-2039 [18]

As shown in Figure 10 temperature rising trend is sharper than other parameters. This will be main paremeter that wil affect other parameters such as water quantity and evaporation. This obtained result can be used for alternative water management programmes in the region.

4 Political Future Predictions for Syria

Although experts have different opinions on how to be shaped new political structure of Syria, a federative structure have begun to gain importance in the last period. Middle East Historian Prof. Dr. George W. Gawrych from USA gave a speech at the Hydro Politics Association on May 12, 2016, saying that Syria would go to a Federative structure. In the "De-escalation and Decentralization" report prepared by former USA advisor Philip Gordon, it is stated that Syria will be separated into a three-part structure and eventually three separate states will come out of it. In the same report, it is stated that Al Nusra and ISIS will not be part of this process. In addition, the think tank organization Rand Corporation of USA also proposes to create a four-part Syria in the Peace Plan for Syria.

In the report "Deconstructing Syria Towards a regionalized strategy for a confederal country" [19] published by the Brookings Institution in 2015, it is stated that the political structure aimed at Syria is towards a confederation composed of many autonomous regions. It is stated that ISIS and El-Nusra will not be found among these autonomous structures and that the confederation will need a peace power.



George Fridman discussed [20] the process of formation in 20th century of the Middle East and finally made the following determination by analyzing the historical hostilities and disputes in the region He stressed that we stop thinking about the stabilization of Syria and Iraq again pointing out "It is time to start thinking about a new dynamism apart from the artificial states that have lost their function."

Friedman's analysis is now shared by many strategists. Many analysts have no worries about what goes on. Even different ideas have already begun to emerge about what the future will be like and about the photograph of the new formation in the dark room. It seems that the players who are on the field today will have no other function than postponing the future of the Middle East. Now the question is how this future will be formed in "this non-future region?"[20].

It is necessary to look at what the decisive actors in the dynamics of the new order will think for the region. The fact that the newly established order in the region is partly stable is very important, especially in terms of northern Iraqi oil and the new hydrocarbon richness in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As it is well known that power balance and optimization in the Middle East is too complex to be solved with existing formulations.

Management in constantly chaos is the main characteristics of the region. Therefore it is called as "non-future geography" by some experts.

5 Conclusions

In the beginning of the 21st century, The Middle East emerged as a geography in chaos which quickly led to a new political structure, the new political structure of the region is likely to increase the number of states or create a number of federative administration.

Studies made by Hydropolitics Association on long term trend in Euphrates and Tigris River flow showed a serious natural diminishing trend of the Tigris and Euphrates streamflows [21]. This alarming fact was argued and confirmed in the recently published articles including the ESCWA Inventory [22] that had already showed diminishing in flow in the 'natural period' before dam constructions Some other studies including made by Hydropolitics Academy showed that the diminishing trend has been continued till now and likely to be the same trend in future [21]. This fact, climate change projections and almost New Syria show that in any way the water equation of the Middle East will change in near future.This situation and almost certain adverse impacts of climate change may bring stronger features of re-securitisation of the water issues in the region.

Linked between water shortage and social instability has already been mentioned in several articles. Water shortage is recognised to be closely connected to social instability in the Middle East.Ultimately, disintegrated Syria or Syria Federation creating a new political landscape together with climate change adverse effects will bring even more serious challenge to the region.

In shortly, water equation will change and water will remain a highly securitised issue in the Tigris-Euphrates basin affecting the future of the Middle East.

Investigations showed that the urgent need of the Middle East will be a more policy-related Hydro-diplomacy approach to facilitate the implementation of climate change adaptation

measures and to guarantee water and food security. Although the Middle East countries need to use Hydro-diplomacy in order to manage their conflicts on a permanent basis, politically reshaped Syria and Iraq can bring new uncertainties and stresses that may put hydro-diplomacy into more difficult and complex situation in the near future.

After New Syria, water as a keytstone of security architecture at the regional level will be considered as essential component of sustainable development, peace and stability. But in any way, a disintegrated Syria will aggregate untrust resulting lack of cooperation between neighbouring countries.This new political landscape and climate impact prone to change water equation puting regional securitiy in threat.

As it is obvious that fighting against climate change and adapting to its consequences in the Middle East is highly depend on confidence building collaborative works in the region. If any measures can not be taken, water and food security and climate forced migration may easily become causes of conflict again in near future. In fact, it is unfortunate to say that dialogue and regional cooperation to achieve a coordinated progress seems to be difficult in uncertanities of the region.

Current political and climatological condition show a strong possibility towards re-securitisation of water issues in Syria Federation ,Northern Iraq, Iraq as well as New Middle East that is going to make water collaboration difficult.

Therefore in the end of the day, an urgent innovative water diplomacy will be the essential element to put a final full stop to the Middle East Security Architecture. Not only Turkey, but also every country in the region should be aware of their responsibilities before action anymore.

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